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   Since the Treaty of Rome, many proponents of European integration have 
hoped that a single Europe would speak with more authority – and more 
influence – in the international arena.  This was certainly true in the 1950s and 
1960s, as a reconstructed Europe attempted to affect international politics in a 
world of super-powers to which it was subordinate.  It has been given added 
urgency, in the minds of many, with the rise of a post-Cold War world dominated 
by a single superpower, the United States.  Whether to temper or to counter 
American demands, recent European experience has heightened the view that 
one Europe would be more influential if it had one foreign policy voice. 
  This calculation has been especially widespread in discussions of 
Europe’s international economic relations.  A common European representation 
in the International Monetary Fund/World Bank system would have more votes 
than the United States – and thus a veto.  At the Bank for International 
Settlements, the Group of 8, the World Trade Organization, and other 
international economic institutions, there is a pervasive view that a pooled 
European presence would increase Europe’s influence.  This is particularly clear 
in international monetary affairs, where there already is a common European 
institution, the European Central Bank, that is the natural representative of the 
euro zone at least.
1 
But a common European international representation is more complicated 
than may appear at first glance.  A collective European voice requires a 
collectively agreed upon policy and bargaining position, which means that it 
                                                 
1  See, on this, McNamara and Meunier 2002.   3
requires compromise among EU members.  In this sense, adopting a common 
international EU policy is analogous to adopting a common internal EU policy:  it 
requires that member states weigh the potential benefits of a common policy 
against the potential costs of a policy that is not to their liking.  And just as with 
other EU policies – such as the general focus on subsidiarity – there is a clear 
tradeoff between the advantages of scale and the disadvantages of overriding 
heterogeneous preferences. 
To better understand the impact, and the likelihood, of shared EU 
representation in international institutions, I make use of simple tools of spatial 
analysis.  This allows me to present some of the political constraints that the 
European Union, its member states, and groups within the member states, face 
in considering whether in fact it is desirable and feasible to unify Europe’s 
international presence.  My goal is not a welfare analysis – for this is effectively 
impossible without a clear baseline, which we do not have – but rather an 
understanding of the choices faced by Europeans as they consider their 
international role.
2 
We can think about the issue in a more positive mode by asking what 
factors make it more or less likely that the EU will pool its presence in 
international institutions.  Already, EU representation varies among international 
organizations.  In some cases, this is for obvious reasons, such as in trade:  it is 
                                                 
2   The “constitutional” choices discussed here are analogous to those 
considered in Berglöf et al. 2003, and the analytical approach is also similar.   4
hard to imagine a single market with 15 different trade policies.
3  But, just as the 
principle of subsidiarity has been applied in ways that lead some EU policies to 
be decided at the EU level, while others remain national, so too is it the case – 
and is it likely to continue to be the case – that the EU’s international presence 
will vary among issue areas and institutions.  The discussion here helps us 
understand why. 
A spatial model of pooled representation 
To analyze the choices available to the European Union’s member states, 
I make use of simple spatial models.
4  I make a series of assumptions for the 
sake of clarity of presentation;  all of them can be abandoned or made more 
complex without altering the general points of the discussion.  One assumption is 
that policy can be mapped onto a single dimension.  This is a heroic assumption 
in general, as it rules out much of the bargaining across issue areas that 
characterizes most of domestic and international politics.  It is somewhat less 
                                                 
3  See, on European trade representation, Meunier 2000 and Meunier and 
Nicolaidïs 1999. 
4  Hug and König 2002, and Rodden 2002, consider other aspects of EU politics 
with similar tools.  There is a large related literature on the impact of EU 
institutions on policy outcomes, with many variants.   Those closest in spirit to the 
approach here are represented by Tsebelis 1994 and Tsebelis and Garrett 1997;  
Bilal and Hosli 2000 is also a closely related example.  While there are important 
differences among these works, they are all of a family of models similar to those 
used here in highly simplified form.   5
heroic of an over-simplification for my purposes, inasmuch as most international 
institutions have limited scope:  EU positions in the IMF are not inherently related 
to EU positions in the World Health Organization.  However, the 
unidimensionality of the spatial models I use does eliminate two possibilities of 
potential relevance.  First, the EU might in fact “cut deals” across institutions – 
conceding something to the United States at the IMF in return for something from 
the United States at the WHO.  Second, even within institutions, policies are 
rarely purely unidimensional:  the IMF is confronted with decisions both about 
enormous financial rescues of troubled commercial debtors (Mexico, East Asia, 
Russia, Argentina) and about programs that are effectively foreign aid to 
extremely poor nations without access to commercial lending.  Nonetheless, the 
assumption of a single dimension helps simplify analysis significantly, and in this 
instance it is close enough to reality to be defensible. 
I assume also a series of voting rules.  To start with, let us say that both 
the EU and the international institutions operate on the principle of one country, 
one vote, with simple majority rule.  Many international organizations do operate 
on this principle, and it is a reasonable starting point.  I further assume that EU 
members can decide, by unanimity rule, to pool their votes to equal the number 
of member states;  the new common policy is binding and is made by majority 
rule.  It is realistic to assume that creating a common international representative 
would require the consent of all EU members;  it is also reasonable that once 
such a joint agent were in place, the EU’s position would be by something less   6
than unanimity.  In any event, these assumptions are not essential, and I relax 
them later. 
An example helps illustrate the point.  For simplicity’s sake, think of an 
international organization (IO) with five member countries, and an EU of three 
member countries.  One distribution of country preferences is represented in 
Figure 1.  The ideal points of the countries are indicated by points a, b  e;  for 
simplicity I refer to the ideal points in lower case (a) and the countries in upper 
case (A).  The ideal points of the three European countries A, B, and C are on 
the center and left of the dimension, with the other two on the right.  The policy in 
question could be any one of a number, such as: 
•financial regulation, where movement leftward implies less support for 
stringent prudential regulation and supervision of national banks 
•macroeconomic policy, where movement leftward implies more support 
for stimulative fiscal or monetary policies 
•IMF conditionality, where movement leftward implies less support for 
restrictive IMF conditions 
•trade policy, where movement leftward implies more support for trade 
liberalization – perhaps in a particular area, such as agriculture or services 
For the purposes of this essay, in order to avoid too much concentration 
on the specifics of any one economic policy arena, I use examples drawn from 
outside the economic realm.  The examples all involve the Iraq war, mapped so 
that movement leftward implies less support for the United States position, and 
based on the obvious fiction that some international institution was essential to   7
the conduct of military operations in Iraq.  The example is useful in large part 
because the positions of both EU and non-EU governments are well known and 
relatively easy to map onto a single dimension. 
In any event, it is plain that without pooling, the equilibrium policy is that of 
the median country-voter, country C;  this is indicated by the up-arrow at point c.  
However, if the three EU members pool their votes, they first arrive at a common 
policy by majority rule – that of the median EU country-voter, country B.  By 
virtue of the EU’s three pooled votes, this common EU policy, point b, then 
becomes the majority-rule outcome, as indicated by the down-arrow.  The result 
makes the EU better off – point b is closer to the ideal points of more EU 
member states than point c.  So pooling has improved the outcome from the 
standpoint of the EU as a whole.  In the Iraq war example, with the United States 
as country E, an international organization of this type without a pooled EU 
representative would have taken a position closer to that of the United States 
than one with a common EU delegation. 
However, this is unlikely to come to pass, for country C would not agree to 
it.  Pooling shifts the equilibrium outcome from c to b, so it makes country C 
worse off – in the Iraqi case, assuming that the UK is C, pooling would have 
shifted the outcome away from Britain’s preferred position, towards a less 
bellicose military stance.  One can imagine circumstances in which country C 
might go along anyway – as part of a trade across issue areas, for example – but 
this simple example indicates an important point:   8
Observation 1.  Member states whose preferences are farther from 
the EU median than they are from the international median are more 
likely to oppose pooling representation, while those whose 
preferences are closer to the EU median than to the international 
median are more likely to support it. 
The reason is that the closer a member state’s preference is to the EU’s 
expected collective preference, the better off it will be with pooling.  After all, the 
more similar are the policy views of a government (or group or individual) to 
those of the EU, the more it would like the EU’s views to prevail.  This helps 
explain in general, for example, why France and Germany, whose foreign policy 
views tend to be closer to the EU median, are more interested in a common 
foreign policy than the United Kingdom, which tends to be an outlier.
5  The 
observation is analogous to similar observations about other EU-wide policies, in 
                                                 
5 This is somewhat misleading;  the observation is stated more accurately.  Only 
preference outliers that deviate toward the international median will oppose 
pooling.  In the example, country A is also a preference outlier but supports 
pooling, for pulling the outcome closer to the EU median pulls it closer to a.  In 
what follows, I refer to preference outliers generically, meaning to restrict them to 
those on the EU extreme and closer to the international median.  This seems 
empirically reasonable (not to speak of more tractable), as most of the instances 
of note involve a subset of EU members with views closer to that of the  United 
States than to that of the rest of the EU, which is the case of country C in the 
example.   9
which preference outliers tend to oppose centralization while those toward the 
center of the preference distribution support it, such as when Scandinavians 
worry that EU-level social policies will be less generous than their own national 
policies.
6 
But this example is an unrepresentative one.  For one thing, EU members 
are a simple majority in the example, which is rarely likely to be the case;  for 
another, pooling does not affect the EU’s bargaining power.  So now let us 
consider, in Figure 2, an international institution with seven members, of which 
there are three EU members (voting rules are as above).  With all states voting 
individually, the outcome is that of the median state-voter, state D.  Even if all 
three EU votes are pooled, there is no impact on the outcome – all that a 
common representation does is stack EU votes at a common point, and with 
majority rule there is no consequential effect.  This simple observation illustrates 
a broader point, that the degree to which joint EU representation affects 
outcomes is sensitive to many features of the international environment:  the 
number of countries in question, the distribution of their preferences, and so on.  
One can imagine many instances in which pooling would have an impact – such 
as if the common EU representative were pivotal – but 
Observation 2.  In and of itself, pooling representation does not 
necessarily increase EU influence over bargained outcomes. 
                                                 
6 For a more general statement of this point, and others related to the treatment 
here, see Crémer and Palfrey 1999.   10
   This highlights an aspect of the discussion of Europe’s international role 
that is often disregarded:  the expectation that a united Europe is greater than the 
sum of its parts.  Most proponents and analysts regard the advantage of pooling 
to be more than simply additive:  that is, there must be something more to 
pooling EU representation than putting together national votes, otherwise it could 
be done by way of voting coalitions.  And there are reasons to think that a more 
formal shared representation could in fact have an added impact on EU 
bargaining power.  For one thing, in many issue areas a joint stance improves 
the EU’s outside option (that is, the alternative to a bargained outcome).
7  In 
negotiations over financial regulations, for example, a country’s bargaining power 
is a function of how costly it would be for the country not to conform to the 
agreed-upon regulations.  And in this context, it is likely that an EU with a 
common European regulatory framework – which it could implement on its own if 
negotiations with the US and Japan broke down – would be much more powerful 
than 15 EU member states each with a different regulatory framework.  Whatever 
the reason, there is typically expected to be some value added from a joint 
representative beyond that of the member states’ own votes.  Analytically, we 
can think of some issue areas and IOs in which pooling is more likely to increase 
EU bargaining power than in other issue areas and IOs.  Common EU positions 
on trade or financial regulation – where outside options, thus bargaining power, 
                                                 
7   For an analysis of intra-EU bargaining that makes use of the outside option of 
member states, see Schneider and Cederman 1994.   11
are related to size – are likely to be greater than the sum of their parts, while a 
common EU position on Amazonian biodiversity may not be.
8 
This situation, in which pooled IO membership improves the EU’s 
bargaining power, can be represented as follows.  Take the same setup as 
above, with three EU states out of a seven-member IO.  Now assume that 
pooling – by improving the EU’s outside option, or for whatever reason – 
increases EU bargaining power such that it has two additional votes, for a total of 
five (see Figure 3).  By construction, then, the outcome will be determined by the 
EU’s collectively defined preference, at point b, as indicated by the down arrow.  
This indicates that increasing the EU’s bargaining power can have a substantial 
impact on outcomes.  It can also be seen from Figure 3 that in this instance, the 
outcome makes all EU member states better off (or at least leaves them the 
same).  As indicated in Figure 4, even for member state C, which is a preference 
outlier in the EU, the costs of preference divergence are counter-balanced by the 
benefits of the EU’s increased influence over outcomes.  Of course, if 
preferences were differently distributed – so that, for example, c was closer to b 
than to d – pooling would make all member states better off, not just indifferent.  
Indeed, the closer EU member state preferences are to one another, and the 
                                                 
8   It is also worth noting that there are other possible component parts of a 
country’s, or the EU’s, bargaining power.  One might be the ability of the actor to 
enforce agreements entered into:  if a collectivity of countries could monitor 
compliance better than the same countries acting independently, they could be 
expected to have a greater impact on outcomes together than separately.   12
farther they are from those of other members of the IO, the greater the benefits 
and the lower the costs of a common position.  In this case, this distribution of 
preferences would have led even the United Kingdom to support a common EU 
position on Iraq – the outcome would have been at least as close to the UK’s 
views as that without a common EU stance. 
  It is also the case, however, that a different distribution of preferences 
within the EU can make the outcome with a pooled representative less appealing 
to some EU members.  In Figure 5, country C’s ideal point is closer to that of 
non-EU member country D than it is to its fellow Europeans.  Since country D 
would be the median country-voter in the original arrangement, without a 
common EU representative, country C would prefer not to pool EU positions.
9  
The gain in the EU’s international bargaining power, in this instance, is more than 
offset by the intra-EU conflict of interests.  This may be closer to the reality in the 
Iraq example:  it is likely that Britain’s position was in fact closer to that of the 
United States than it was to the median EU member – so that Britain would not 
have supported a common stance.  This illustrates another fundamental point 
about the way in which EU positions are developed and expressed in the 
international arena: 
                                                 
9  The story does not stop here.  In fact, other EU members could offer a policy to 
country C that is equal to cd but in the opposite direction, making C indifferent 
between the pooled position and d.  If, however, pooling is by unanimity rule and 
position-taking by majority rule, it does not seem plausible that the commitment 
to this class of offers over time would be credible.   13
Observation 3.  There is a tradeoff between the added bargaining 
power of a common EU representative, on the one hand, and the 
need to override heterogeneous preferences, on the other. 
This point is analogous to that in the literature on other government functions, 
such as on European subsidiarity, currency unions, or the size of nations.  There 
are scale economies to the aggregation of government functions, such as 
diplomacy;  but there are costs to forcing heterogenous actors to adopt a 
common policy position.
10 
  It might be useful to give some illustrative examples.  Starting with the first 
observation, it stands to reason that countries whose views are more like those 
of other nations than they are like those of their fellow EU members would be 
unlikely to want to increase the EU’s international influence.  A country with views 
on macroeconomic policy coordination, or financial regulation, or foreign aid, or 
IMF policy very similar to those of the United States and very different from those 
of other EU members, would be foolish to do anything to increase the EU’s 
relative influence and diminish that of the United States. 
  The second observation is in a sense related to the first.  Even an EU 
preference outlier would care little about the choice of common or distinct EU 
voting if this were unlikely to have little impact on international policy outcomes.  
And it is not hard to think of instances in which a joint and common delegation 
                                                 
10  See, as important examples, Alesina and Spolaore 1997, Bolton and Roland 
1997, and Casella 1992.  A similar tradeoff between risk-sharing and 
redistribution is identified in Persson and Tabellini 1996.   14
would not necessarily increase the EU’s bargaining power – the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, perhaps – and so the change in European 
representation would be of little import. 
 T h e   t h i r d   o b s e r v a t i o n ,   a b o u t   t h e   t r a d e o f f   b e t w e e n   i n c r e a s e d   b a r g a i n i n g  
power and the need for a common EU position, is perhaps the most important 
and richest in implications and applications.  Just as similar propositions provide 
a way of thinking about the choices facing EU members considering centralizing 
authority at the European level, it fixes ideas about the positive political economy 
of – rather than the normative opinions or journalistic punditry relating to – 
European international representation.  Every individual country, this says, must 
weigh the impact of a greater international role of the Europe of which they are a 
part against the compromises they will have to make to arrive at a common 
European position.  The comparative static properties of this observation are 
simple and important and can be applied to policy areas, or international 
institutions, in which there is variation in EU bargaining power and member state 
preferences.  They can be applied to analyses of individual member-state views 
on a common international representation, or on the overall likelihood of such a 
common representation emerging.  This discussion implies, for example, that all 
else equal, the more pooling increases the EU’s international bargaining power, 
the more likely it is.  All else equal, the greater the divergence of views among 
EU member states, the less likely is the EU to agree on a common international 
voice.  All else equal, countries that anticipate very serious compromises – 
whose policy positions are far from those of their EU partners – are less likely to   15
support pooling.  And all else equal, countries with positions similar to those of 
their European partners are likely to be most favorable to common 
representatives.   
Extensions and applications 
  Even this rudimentary discussion reveals some of the complexity of the 
political economy of a common European international voice.  If the discussion is 
made more realistic, the implications are more complex still.  There are two areas 
in which our assumptions were particularly simplistic:  the distribution of 
preferences, and the voting rules both inside the EU and internationally.  In 
addition, we ignored the domestic politics of these issues.
11 
  The distribution of preferences.  For ease of exposition, preferences in the 
examples given above were distributed so that EU members were bunched with 
each other, and clearly differentiated from non-EU members.  Without providing 
details – the reader can simply reshuffle positions in the figures – it is clear that 
virtually any outcome is possible if government preferences are differently 
arranged.  The relationship among member state views, and between member 
state views and those of non-EU countries, defines the range of feasible 
coalitions, and the range of possible outcomes.  It is thus a fundamental 
determinant of constraints on EU decision-making.  While this makes actual 
analysis more complex, it does not reduce the usefulness of the exercise.  
                                                 
11   Perhaps even more fundamental is the assumption of a single-dimensional 
policy space;  but abandoning this assumption would add a great deal of 
complexity without obvious advantages in this particular application.    16
Coming up with a realistic sense of government preferences is central to 
understanding the likely outcome of inter-governmental bargaining. 
  Voting rules.  The impact of different voting rules on outcomes is also 
crucial, especially in the international arena, where majority rule is quite rare.  
Indeed, it is also rare in the European Union itself.  So we need to consider how 
intra-EU voting rules, and the voting rules of the international organizations of 
which the EU is a member, might affect outcomes. 
  We can start with an extreme case, which is actually quite common both 
internationally and in the EU:  unanimity, which gives each country a veto.
12  The 
fact that with unanimity rule each EU member state has a veto would normally 
provide no reason for any EU member to want to move toward a common 
representation, as this implies giving up its veto.  Moving from a situation in 
which EU member states have 15 vetoes to one in which they have only one 
collective veto might make most EU members better off, if the countries losing 
the veto were far from the EU median, but it would not be accepted by countries 
that would lose out as a result.
13  And in many (if not most) reasonable 
                                                 
12 Colomer 1999 is an excellent spatial analysis of unanimity rule, emphasizing 
the central importance of the reversion point to outcomes. 
13   Some of the discussion here abstracts from the fact that the European Union 
is a highly institutionalized organization, with clearly specified rules for many 
eventualities.  The presumption here that EU voting rules might be subject to 
negotiation may be accurate in principle, but irrelevant in practice.   
   17
preference distributions, pooling in a unit-veto system would make the EU worse 
off.   
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate international bargaining with a unit-veto system.  
The main change to the setup here is the addition of the reversion point, also 
called the point of no-agreement or the status quo, indicated here by SQ.  This is 
the situation that will prevail should the members of the IO not reach an 
agreement – the previously agreed upon policy, the absence of policy, whatever 
may be the case.  In a unit-veto (consensus) system, the outcome must 
dominate the status quo for all players, else they will not agree to the change.  In 
Figure 6, with each of the three EU states having an independent veto, the 
biggest possible change is from SQ to point b, indicated by the up arrow, which 
leaves state A indifferent between b and the status quo.  In Figure 7, the three 
EU states pool their votes, so that they have a collective veto – at the median, 
point b, indicated by the up arrow.  [If the EU’s collective veto were itself decided 
upon by unanimity, there would be no difference from independent EU 
delegations.]  Then the outcome that leaves the pooled EU delegation indifferent, 
point d, indicated by the down arrow, is the outcome.  In this instance, two of the 
three EU members are worse off and the third is no better off.  This illustrates the 
more general point that the EU would not, on its own merits, be likely to give up 
its members’ vetoes for a collective veto (unless, of course, it received something 
else in exchange). 
   The more general point is that voting rules change bargaining outcomes, 
in predictable if hardly simple ways.  And voting rules in international institutions   18
can themselves be highly complex.  The European Union uses a combination of 
unanimity, simple majority, and qualified majority voting;  and, depending on the 
issue area, one would have also to include the roles of the European 
Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Central Bank.  
International organizations also have a wide variety of voting rules, including the 
IMF’s quota-based weighted-voting system, with weights that have changed over 
time.  Without going into detail on the matter, suffice it to say, once more, that an 
analysis of the institutional causes and consequences of the EU’s international 
presence is sensitive to intra-EU and international voting rules. 
  Domestic politics.  One last observation is worth making, about the 
domestic politics of the EU’s international role.  Just as governments of member 
states formulate their views on a common EU position based on how close it is 
likely to be to their own, so too can groups within countries.
14  An interest group 
closer to the EU median than to its national median will prefer that policy be 
made at the European, rather than the national level, and vice versa.  So in 
Figure 8, I show two broad groups within country C, one on its left (cL) and one 
on its right (cR).  Because the domestic Left is closer to the European median, it 
will prefer a common European representative (whose views will be closer to its 
own than to those of its national governnment), while the interests of the 
domestic Right are opposite.  This relationship – which applies, of course, to 
                                                 
14  The issue has been the subject of a large literature on “two-level games,” 
linking foreign and domestic politics.  A recent example is Milner and Rosendorff 
1997.   19
European policies more generally, such as when the Left in a left-wing country 
prefers national to European social policies – helps explain some of the partisan 
characteristics of debates over Europe’s international role.  Many on the British 
Left prefer a European foreign policy to a more moderate independent British 
foreign policy;  many on the Swedish Left prefer an independent Swedish foreign 
policy to a more moderate European foreign policy. 
Concluding remarks 
  The discussion in this essay leads to few unambiguous conclusions.  But 
that is one of its points:   the implications of a common European international 
position depend in very important ways on circumstance.  The distribution of 
preferences within and outside the EU, along with the voting rules used by the 
EU and the international institutions, have a profound effect on the ways in which 
Europe’s member states would aggregate their views up into a common position, 
and on the impact of that common position on international affairs. 
  But all is not lost to scholarly indecisiveness.  There are several 
implications of general note.  Most generally, the aggregation of European Union 
representatives into one EU-wide joint and common representative brings into 
play a fundamental tradeoff, between the benefits of increased bargaining power 
and the costs of compromise among heterogeneous interests.  This, in turn, has 
significant implications.  European governments with more extreme views 
(compared to the rest of the EU) will be less likely to support a common 
international position.  The greater the added bargaining power associated with a 
pooled representation, the more likely EU member states are to support it.    20
Domestic groups will support national or joint representation based on whether 
their own positions are closer to the national view or to the EU-wide view.  These 
considerations are hardly trivial, and they will play an important role as Europe 
moves toward a more federal form of representation in international politics. 
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